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The Lockyer Valley region in southeast Queensland, Australia experienced extreme flash
flooding in January 2011 that resulted in the loss of 19 lives including 12 in the township
of Grantham. In order to reduce future risks, the Lockyer Valley Regional Council (LVRC)
immediately committed to an innovative community resettlement project, despite an
environment of political resistance and bureaucratic turmoil. From a local government
perspective, this paper provides an overview and examination of the unique disaster
recovery and resettlement process undertaken by the LVRC. A mixed methods approach
was used to assess the resettlement project in terms of political, cultural, social and
financial factors that act to sustain and improve people's lives and livelihoods. Methods
included field observations, documentary analysis, focus group discussions and semi-
structured interviews with key LVRC officers. Integrating the interview data sets and a
variety of source materials, this paper assesses the early-stage outcomes of the resettle-
ment and recovery process in Grantham and discusses the challenges and issues identified
in the process so far. The paper addresses the significance of collaboration between all
sectors involved including community members; governments; and land-use planning
and emergency management practitioners. This research highlights the importance of
community participation and the need for ongoing assessments in the resettlement and
recovery process.
& 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.1. Introduction
Resettlements and land-swap initiatives, if managed well,
offer one of the best long-term strategies for disaster risk
reduction, not only saving lives but also reducing the future
response and recovery costs [31,35]. However, as a number
of studies have demonstrated, although exposure may be
reduced, resettlement can increase social vulnerability, iner Ltd.
ada).
Open access under CC Bparticular access to livelihood security, and in some cases
expose people to new risks [4,12,14,20,32,36,51]. One barrier
to effective resettlement can be that stakeholders are not
adequately consulted and planning is desultory, decisions are
made quickly, reactively and usually in a top-down fashion
[4,32,51]. With this in mind, this study chronicles the
resettlement of a community in the town of Grantham, in
the Lockyer Valley, Queensland, Australia and its early
achievements. The voluntary land-swap scheme, also termed
the “land-swap program”, was instigated by the Lockyer
Valley Regional Council (hereafter LVRC) immediately follow-
ing a flash flooding disaster in 2011. This is one of the onlyY-NC-ND license.
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town has been resettled in response to a natural disaster and
the first since the early 20th century [10].
The land-swap scheme followed a widespread flooding
in Queensland, Australia, between December 2010 and
January 2011. More than 78% of the State was declared as
a disaster zone, 33 people lost their lives and another three
remain missing [41]. Amongst those areas impacted, flash
flooding occurred in Toowoomba and the Lockyer Valley
region on 10 January 2011. The flash flood event was caused
by a combination of factors: intense rainfall; a ground
already saturated; and steep topography. Damage to the
region was severe, particularly to the township of Gran-
tham, which sat immediately adjacent to the Lockyer Creek
on the floodplain. In the Lockyer Valley, 19 people lost their
lives (12 of them in Grantham), 119 houses were destroyed
and a further 2798 houses inundated, while the local
infrastructure was also damaged significantly [28].
The bulk of the existing literature of resettlement deals
with communities who had been forcibly displaced due to
dam development [46]. These studies suggest four different
stages experienced by those who must resettle [32,46]:1. Recruitment of beneficiaries and the planning for their
removal and development: This occurs rapidly. People
with resources and connections migrate, leaving behind
those with limited capacity.2. Adjustment and coping: Covering transition and settle-
ment. The new community is often risk adverse. Living
standards are low. This stage can last many years or
indefinitely if poorly managed.3. Development: If opportunities for livelihood develop-
ment exist or are supported then economic and social
development can occur. The community begins to take
risks and living standards improve.4. Incorporation and hand-over: Responsibilities and assets
are handed over for local governance. A new generation
takes over.Measuring the success of a resettlement is difficult,
although, metrics such as the extent of investment in the
new community i.e. dwellings occupied, extensions built,
new private buildings built following the scheme, invest-
ment in gardens, etc. can be documented [32]. It is widely
recognised that for a resettlement initiative to be successful,
provisions for livelihood opportunities and sustainable
development must be met [9,32,46,51]. Correa et al. [11]
propose that resettlement for disaster recovery and preven-
tion must not only focus on the provision of accommodation
but also political, cultural, social and financial factors that
act to sustain/improve people's livelihoods.
While it is too early to evaluate the long-term success of
the LVRC's land-swap scheme, this paper aims to assess the
progress thus far from a local government perspective. To
achieve this, the paper describes the LVRC's post-event
initiatives during the response and recovery phases,
explores the land-swap scheme, and discusses issues and
challenges identified so far and those anticipated in the
future. In order to assess the current progress of the LVRC's
land-swap project, a list of factors influencing the success ofa resettlement plan, developed by Correa et al. [11] (Table 1),
was adopted and served as the basis and methodological
framework for this research. The LVRC's recovery initiative
focuses on revitalising Grantham [29]. According to the
literature reviewed above, the idea of revitalisation should
include community participation in order to ensure it
improves people's lives and livelihoods. This fits well with
the framework proposed by Correa et al. [11].
To provide background to the research, the paper first
describes the regional setting and flash flood event before
detailing the methodology used to collect and analyse
the data.
2. Background
2.1. The Lockyer Valley and the Lockyer Creek Catchment
The Lockyer Valley had a population of 34,954, with
492 residents living within the suburb of Grantham in
2011 [3]. The Lockyer Valley plays an important role in
agricultural production in southeast Queensland [13] pro-
viding employment to 20% of Grantham's population [3].
The Lockyer Creek Catchment is located approximately
75 kmwest of Brisbane encompassing an area of 3000 km2
[45]. Of this, the Upper Lockyer Creek Catchment has an
area of 710 km2 that funnels flood water 15–25 km down
to Grantham [45]. The Great Dividing Range, where the
regional city of Toowoomba (population: 151,189, [3]) is
located, is the western boundary of the catchment (Fig. 1).
This land configuration of steep slopes with a number of
tributaries contributed to the rapid onset of the series of
2011 flash flooding events in the region.
2.2. The flash flooding event
By 10 January 2011, more than 550 mm of rain had
fallen in the area since early December 2010, including a
three week period of rain with only three days without
rainfall [44]. The soil around Toowoomba and the Lockyer
Valley was saturated by early January 2011. As pressure
troughs moved towards the west of Queensland, a series of
heavy thunderstorms impacted Toowoomba and the Lock-
yer Valley region on 9 and 10 January 2011 [7,18].
The storms caused torrential rainfall between 60 and
120 mm for 1.5 to 2 h in Toowoomba [18]. The severity of
the rainfall recorded exceeded an average recurrence
interval of 100 year intensity at six out of nine rain gauge
stations for the duration of 30 min to 3 h [18]. This rainfall,
falling on already saturated ground, rapidly flooded gullies
and streets, forming a ‘wall’ of water [52]. The Prince
Henry Drive rainfall station, located between Toowoomba
and Withcott, recorded 117 mm of rain for the 3 h of
12:00–15:00 AEST on 10 January, of which 74 mm had
fallen between 13:00–14:00 [17]. The confluence of this
rainfall, together with the rainfall in the surrounding areas,
hit the Lockyer Valley townships of Withcott, Murphys
Creek, Postmans Ridge, Helidon and Grantham [38].
The flash flooding occurred in the region at around
14:30 on 10 January [52]. Little or no public warnings were
issued prior to the event due to its suddenness and the
lack of alarm-activating water gauges in many areas [38].
Table 1
Dimensions of a resettlement process (taken from [11] pp.55–56).
Dimension Attributes
Physical Individual unit of land capable of demarcation, designated by a legal term in each country (e.g., property, plot, lot). Has defined
boundaries and dimensions so that a measurable surface area or area with a specific perimeter can be established. May be urban
or rural
Built structures, whether for housing or to pursue an economic activity (industrial, business, service, agricultural, animal
husbandry, mining, or forestry activity, among others)
Public service infrastructure (e.g., water, power, transportation, sanitation)
Infrastructure for social services (e.g., education and health) and community uses (e.g., recreation, sports, religious or social
activities)
Legal Rights to land held by persons living or working on it, and rights to structures built on it, reflected as different forms of tenure,
also legally defined in each country (e.g., owner, holder, tenant, usufructuary, squatter, trespasser, etc.)
Lawful or unlawful use of public services
Lawfulness of the settlement
Economic Value of the land and built structures on it
Productive activities and income levels, activities that can be pursued on the property in the high-risk area, its surrounding area,
or at other sites involving daily travel to pursue them
Income from total or partial renting of a property
Social Population, family and social organisation, socioeconomic characteristics, and social support and mutual assistance networks.
Skills for interacting with the environment and survival strategies developed
Delivery of education and health services
Psychological Emotional bonds with housing, neighbours, communities, and the surrounding area
Cultural Practices and customs of individuals and communities, which have manifestations that are tangible (e.g., type of housing, use of
space) and intangible (e.g., beliefs, preferences, tastes, etc.)
Environmental Demand for and use of the natural environmental resources (water, power) and solid waste and wastewater disposal
Management of housing and infrastructure demolition materials
Political-
administrative
Political and administrative organisation of each country for its territorial management (e.g., departments, provinces,
municipalities, cantons, towns, communes, neighbourhoods, etc.)
Authorities of the political-administrative unit
Territorial Land use and planning of the area, which determines, among other things, suitable sites for human settlement, either owing to
their natural characteristics or economic and social uses defined by the competent authorities
Fig. 1. Lockyer Creek and Upper Lockyer Creek Catchments with ground elevation. The purple boundary represents the Lockyer Creek Catchment, while the
white boundary with a dotted line represents the Upper Lockyer Creek Catchment.
(Source: [45]).
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warnings, it was already too late when the specific “Flash
Flood Warning for the Lockyer Creek” was issued at 17:00
[8,40,44].
The flood, which surged through Withcott and Gran-
tham, had an estimated peak discharge of 3500–4000 m3/s
[17]. The Lockyer Creek water level at the Gatton manual
gauge reached 15.38 m on 11 January 2011 [6]. Although
this figure was lower than the previous record of 16.33 m
set during the 1893 floods, the water height was estimated
to have reached 18.00 m [50]. As well as the loss of 19
lives, including 12 in the township of Grantham, the flash
flooding destroyed 119 houses in the Lockyer Valley, more
than 1000 cars in Toowoomba and the Lockyer Valley and
damaged 77% of the LVRC's road infrastructure, including
40 bridges [28].3. Methodology
A mixed methods aproach was utilised in order to
provide a broader picture of the recovery and resettlment
process, including a thorough understanding of the LVRC's
response as well as issues and challenges identified. The
methods consisted ofTab
The
M
F
F
DField observations.
 Focus group discussions.
 Semi-structured face-to-face interviews.
 Analysis of government documents, media reports and
interviews, and conference papers.
Full details of these are provided in Table 2.
Field observations were undertaken on 17 April 2012 in
the flood-impacted areas of Grantham, Helidon and Mur-
phys Creek, and the new estate of Grantham, in order to
obtain a detailed understanding of the local geography;
the resettlement land blocks; physical impacts; depths and
behaviours of the flood water; and status of the buildings
including those that were removed, impacted and
repaired. Information gathered in this observation, which
included informal discussions with local government offi-
cials, was used to develop questions for the more formal
focus group and semi-structured interview.le 2
various methods used in the analysis.
ethod Aims
ield observations First-hand observations of the land swap program
introduction to the scheme
ocus group and semi-
structured interview
To discuss the LVRC land swap programme in ter
 Concept of the initiative
 Community involvement
 Design of the resettlement
 External collaborations
 Compliance with land use and emergency m
policies
ocument analysis Further details of the steps taken in the post-dis
resettlement project in chronological orderLocal government officials who played a key role in the
resettlement project were contacted by phone and email
and invited to participate in the research. A focus group
discussion (FGD) was conducted on 24 April 2012 with
four LVRC officers, including the Mayor, the executive
manager of strategy and planning, the managing director
of Strengthening Grantham project and the media rela-
tions advisor. The FGD ran for 1 h and was held at the LVRC
office. Following the FGD, further field observations were
undertaken in the new estate of Grantham. Accompanied
by the government officials, this fieldwork enabled us to
gather more detailed information on the land-swap
scheme.
An in-depth semi-structured interview was then held
on 30 October 2012 with the Mayor and the executive
liaison advisor (the former media relations advisor). This
interview was to follow up on issues raised in the FGD. The
interview was held at an office in Sydney and ran for
approximately 2 h. In order to clarify and update informa-
tion collected during the study, council officials were
contacted via email in 2013.
The discussion topics of the FGD and the subsequent in-
depth interview are listed in Table 2. The authors took
notes and digitally recorded the interviews. The qualitative
data was then analysed thematically, with key themes and
topics of interest coded. Direct quotes from the FGD and
interview have been placed within the results section in
order to highlight key issues.
Documentary analysis was undertaken and a range of
published and grey literature was reviewed. The main
sources are listed in Table 2. The LVRC (2011b, 2012b and
2012c) and Simmonds and Davies [47] were used to
analyse the details and progress of the resettlement
project. The media interviews were used to further inves-
tigate issues identified during the FGD and interview.4. Results
4.1. LVRC's response
4.1.1. Decision making process
On the morning following the flood, it was clear that parts
of Grantham had been destroyed and what remained wasTiming/source
me and Undertaken on 17 and 24 April 2012
ms of:
anagement
Undertaken on 24 April and 30 October 2012
aster 2GB 873AM [1]; Lockyer Valley Regional Council
[25,28,29]; Simmonds & Davies [46]
T. Okada et al. / International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 8 (2014) 20–3124severely damaged. After witnessing the destruction, the LVRC
Mayor recalled thinking “If you’re ever going to make a
change, now's the time to do it” ([21] p.18). This was the
stimulus for action by the LVRC, who immediately set about
discussing better options before rebuilding in flood affected
areas commenced [21].
“So within days, this discussion immediately started…We felt
really strongly that it's ridiculous to build this thing back in
the position where this may happen. Well, this may be 1 in
2000 years, may be… 1 in 10,000 years, we don't know. But
the reality is ‘it has happened before’…we know it happened
in our lifetime, we need to look for something better.”
Simmonds and Davies [47] describe how the LVRC made a
critical decision to act quickly, finding a non-flood prone land
parcel for community resettlement close by. They wished to
provide certainty quickly and establish a clear vision of the
future for the community. It was supported by a number of
residents, who were faced with difficulties such as declining
land values and a lack of existing flood-free residential lots
[47]. The LVRC decided on eliminating the risk of future
flooding, rather than simply mitigating it. The policy involved
the voluntary resettlement of residents from the flooded
townships of Grantham, Murphys Creek, Postmans Ridge,
Withcott and Helidon, whose homes had been destroyed or
suffered major damage, to higher ground outside the flood
zone [25].
One official noted that although the resettlement land
was not on the market it was quickly made available and
the new development area was purchased by the LVRC in
April 2011. The land parcel included approximately 935Fig. 2. Resettlement area and the estimated 2011 flood extent in Grantham. The
the yellow shading covers the area eligible for the land-swap scheme, the red d
and the red shading indicates the approximate residential section.
(Source: [25,43]).acres of freehold land adjoining the existing township of
Grantham on a hill-side not affected by the recent flooding
[39,29] (Fig. 2). The resettlement area (residential section)
and the flash flood-affected area in Grantham are physi-
cally separated by approximately 50 m at the closest
section between them. The difference in ground elevation
of the two closest sections is 3 m (approximately 124.5 m
above sea level in the resettlement area and 121.5 m in the
flooded area).
The LVRC funded the land purchase from internal
resources and this site was considered large enough to
accommodate future growth of the town [29,47]. Officials
stated that the planning amendment for the area had not
been realised prior to the 2011 flood event because the
land was outside the urban footprint and not previously
classified as available for development by the Queensland
Department of Infrastructure and Planning [37,39].
“In Queensland, you have… a planning arrangement, what
they call South East Queensland Regional Plan, which dictates
where you can have urban development. But this land was
not in that part of the plan. So, they, she [the then QLD
Premier] then said to me ‘You cannot develop it. It's outside
of the Regional Plan’. So I said, well you know ‘This is an
emergency situation. The whole of Australia is watching. Even
[if you] do whatever you like, but we are going to build the
plots and you have to put us in jail’.”
The basic structure of land use planning, approval, con-
struction and management is built on procedures designed to
ensure all the relevant systems, such as urban development,
infrastructure, transport and environmental administration,light blue shading represents the estimated extent of the 2011 flooding,
otted boundary demarks the approximate extent of the resettlement site
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years of consideration and adjustment to update land use
plans. However, according to the interview and documentary
data, the LVRC effectively bypassed many of the normal land
use planning procedures in order to expedite Grantham's
recovery process. Without this rapidly executed process
residents may have started rebuilding on the same flood-
prone site. The LVRC's speedy actions provided an opportunity
to secure the community's safety against future flood risks,
even though the action might be considered a breach of the
normal planning procedures.
4.1.2. Community engagement and collaboration with other
groups
The LVRC worked closely with urban design and plan-
ning consultants to (a) develop a site analysis; (b) facilitate
planning workshops with the community; and (c) estab-
lish a preferred master plan for the new site, engaging
with the community throughout the process [47].
“…the minute this thing happened, we met with the
people… I went out to those meetings and… they are
very difficult meetings… you have got 400 people that are
emotionally in a very bad state… [However] that was
really, really important, because… had we not… taken
that step, if we've not been in that leading situation, we
could not have achieved what we have achieved.”
Senior Queensland police officers and LVRC officials
facilitated extensive community consultations and a series
of public meetings [21,42,47]. The LVRC believed that suc-
cessful recovery should be responsive and adaptive, centring,
engaging and empowering local communities to move
forward [26]. The focus of this initiative was placed on the
local residents and businesses, in supporting them to be safe,
secure and sustainable, while developing their future risk
awareness and preparedness [26]. The master plan for
resettlement and recovery, which reflected the local resi-
dents’ voices collected through the public meetings, was
presented back to the community on 26 March 2011 – only
10 weeks after the flood event [47] (Fig. 3).
On 8 April 2011, the Queensland Reconstruction
Authority (QRA) under the QRA Act 2011 (QRA Act)
declared Grantham as a reconstruction area. This enabled
the process to be fast-tracked through the regulatory
system [47,39]. The QRA is the representing unit of the
State of Queensland, whose functions include to work closely with affected communities to ensure
each community's needs are recognised in the rebuild-
ing and recovery of the communities; to facilitate flood mitigation for affected communities
and to ensure the protection, rebuilding and recovery of
affected communities is
I. effectively and efficiently carried out; and
II. appropriate, having regard to the nature of the
disaster event ([49] pp.12–13).
The QRA collaborated closely with the LVRC, attending
community workshops in Grantham from March 2011
as an observer. The QRA officials were therefore well
aware of the need to avoid regulatory hurdles that wouldinterfere in the resettlement on safer ground [39]. The
QRA upgraded the LVRC's master plan into a regulatory
framework: the Proposed Development Scheme for the
Grantham Reconstruction Area, which was made available
for further public consultation from 11 May to 23 June
2011 [47]. Six submissions were received, and these were
incorporated into the Proposed Development Scheme,
which was officially accepted as the Submitted Scheme
on 30 June 2011 [39,47]. In parallel to this, construction
of engineering works (sewerage, town water, roads,
stormwater, etc.) began at the new site on 7 June 2011
[47,42].
“…there's no doubt there was… scepticism early on… the
only way that people were gonna believe that we were
actually gonna do this is when they see the bulldozers out
there pushing… this isn't 3 years down the track, like a
normal development.”
The LVRC also worked closely with media groups
throughout the project term to keep the local residents
informed and to sustain the significance of the project
among political leaders [29].
However, the Queensland Government was negative
about the idea of the Grantham resettlement (2GB [1]).
One LVRC official stated
“Council then made the decision that we would… first of
all talk to the government… State government officials
were not keen on the idea… to them [the resettlement
plan] was too simple, it couldn't work, why would you
even consider it, all those sorts of things… I think that
aspect of government's response is very typical to what
happens in Australia. People don't like change… they
absolutely detest change. But here we had something that
was so, so obvious… the place has been destroyed. You've
got a safe piece of land right there in a perfect circum-
stance. Why wouldn't you at least investigate it? But they
didn't even investigate it.”
As the LVRC plans developed, the state government
revealed that they would not support the project.
“I met with the Premier at that time. And I just said ‘…We
will be proceeding.’ And she said ‘… It will be at your
financial and political risk.’”
It was also reported that the state government desired
that all communication regarding the LVRC resettlement
plans was filtered through them.
“… the state government, through the Reconstruction
Authority and the Premier, wanted all communication
through them even to the federal government. We were
totally against that and didn't participate in that. We
made our own approaches to whoever we wanted to
approach… Had we gone through them, we wouldn't
have the estate.”
Another issue noted by officials was that the state
government was concerned that they would be obligated
to match, dollar for dollar, any federal money handed
down to the LVRC, which they were reluctant to do.
Fig. 3. Master plan of the Grantham reconstruction as of 27 April 2011.
(Source: [42]).
T. Okada et al. / International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 8 (2014) 20–3126“We then met with the Prime Minister. We made our
arrangement for them to give us some money. After the
federal government had given this money, the stategovernment then realised they were in a bad circum-
stance. It was all about politics. It was about control, all
those sorts of things and not wanting to spend money.”
T. Okada et al. / International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 8 (2014) 20–31 27However, once the LVRC received contributions from
the federal government, the state government reconsid-
ered their stance. This brought the total financial package
to $18 million for the provision of infrastructure for the
new site [29].4.2. Recovery of the Lockyer Valley community –
resettlement
According to the Grantham Relocation Policy ([25]
pp.4–8), property owners that are deemed eligible for
the land-swap were given the option to swap their existing
block of land for one of similar size within the newly
developed area (Table 3). Participation in the program was
voluntary and those residents who chose to take part
were able to nominate their preferred block(s). The final
allocation was determined by a ballot carried out by anTable 3
Overview of the land-swap program (adapted from [25] pp.5–6).
Existing single block size Land offer programme App
From 500 m2 to 1500 m2 Residential block of approximately 1000 m2 No
to p
From 1501 m2 to 3000 m2 Residential block of approximately 2000 m2
From 3001 m2 to 8000 m2 Residential block of approximately 4000 m2
From 8001 m2 or greater Residential block of approximately 10,000 m2
Fig. 4. Grantham reconstruction – Stage 1 Ballot Plan as of 4 May 2011.
(Source: [27]).independent consultant to ensure transparency. Where a
land-swap has taken place, the LVRC was required to
assume ownership of the vacated land and use it for
non-residential purposes, such as for grazing or pasture.
Prior to vacating the land, however, the resident was
required to remove all existing buildings. To supplement
the costs associated with resettlement, the state govern-
ment provided special grants of $35,000 for eligible land-
holders. Residents were also exempt from paying transfer
duty on their new lots [47].
One LVRC official stated that the initial ballot was held
on 6 August 2011 in which 72 land-owners took up the
offer of land swap (Fig. 4). A further 12 residents took up
the offer on a second ballot held on 18 February 2012.
Originally designed to end on 30 June 2012, the land-
swap offer was extended for another 12 months to further
increase participation [29]. According to one LVRC official,
as at July 2013, all 115 land blocks in the new estate hadlicable fees
contribution required. However, no compensation will be paid
roperty owners for downsizing to the offered lot size in each category
T. Okada et al. / International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 8 (2014) 20–3128been signed up and there are 45 houses either completed
or under construction.
The LVRC has incorporated flexibility within the project
to accommodate unforeseen developments or advances in
knowledge. For example, Laidley South, another flood-prone
township in the LVRC area that was not originally included
in the land-swap scheme, has now been added to the
resettlement project, in view of its high risk to flood [29].
However, some impacted residents who initially
decided to participate in the project have chosen to opt
out and there are others who chose not to participate from
the start. Some of these residents have left the community,
others plan to leave while some have chosen to stay and
repair their existing home. Potential reasons for not
participating are financial constraints. For example, resi-
dents who cannot afford to demolish their existing house
in the original location and / or cannot build a new home
in the resettlement site after land-swapping may choose to
stay and repair their damaged houses [2]. There are also
likely to be psychological and social factors influencing
non-participation. In order to address any potential issues,
the LVRC provided one-on-one support for the flood-
impacted residents as part of the recovery initiative [24].
The non-participating residents, despite the LVRC's strong
recommendation to participate, are required to sign a
disclaimer stating that they have been informed of the
scheme and have declined to participate.
Along with the resettlement, the LVRC has further
development plans, which are designed to revitalise the
Grantham community as a whole [29]. The new develop-
ment site of Grantham is located adjacent to the Warrego
Highway (connecting Toowoomba to Brisbane) that
bypassed the old Grantham entirely. Lack of access to the
highway was believed to have been responsible for a pre-
flood overall decline in Grantham. One initiative planned
to revitalise the community is the establishment of the
Lockyer Valley Economic Development Precinct, which
directly connects to the highway through the Gatton West
Industrial Zone [29]. This proposed development and
connection to an arterial link seeks to provide economic
and employment opportunities in agribusiness, a leading
industry of the region, in order to ensure long term
sustainability of the community [29].
The LVRC also has future plans to develop a further 400
land blocks on the new site, with the expectation that new
residents will move in from outside the LVRC's flood-
affected areas [42]. This will assist with the LVRC's long-
term development target of additional dwellings required
by 2031 to accommodate the forecast population growth in
the South East Queensland region [37]. The LVRC has also
accepted more than 600 construction workers, providing
training programs for the previously unemployed [29].
During the development process, services (such as sewer-
age) will also be provided to other communities in the
council area where they are currently not available [47].
5. Discussion
This paper has revealed a number of contributing
factors that enabled the rapid progress of the resettlement
project, some of which are likely to be unique to the LVRCand Grantham itself. Firstly, Grantham has a relatively
small population and the impacted areas were limited.
Secondly, the land for resettlement was available adjacent
to the existing township. Thirdly, the LVRC had enough
economic reserve to initiate the project and purchase the
new land. However, a number of other factors, that could
be transferred to other locations in Australia and world-
wide, can also be identified that enabled a timely process
of resettlement. Holding a number of early community
consultations facilitated general consensus despite the
physical and emotional hardship in the community. The
LVRC's untraditional political decisions opened the way
and facilitated the process. These factors significantly
accelerated the momentum of the resettlement project.
In addition, the project aims to drive regional economic
and population growth in the region. In what follows, we
consider the various attributes of the resettlement pro-
gram under the categories given in Table 1.
5.1. Physical
The new settlement area consists of residential lots of
four differing block-sizes, approved by the QRA. Eligible
community members are allocated land parcels with
clearly defined boundaries based on their existing land
sizes, and this provides the flexibility of choice of land
parcel location within the new estate. The building struc-
ture of individual houses depends on each resident, but
public infrastructure within the resettlement area was
prepared before the houses were built. One LVRC official
stated that most of the $18 million in supporting funds
from the federal and state governments were spent for the
infrastructure construction. Moreover, proximity to most
public services is maintained, as the resettlement area is
adjacent to the surviving pre-existing part of the township.
Flooding impacted the Lockyer Valley region in January
2013, only two years after the 2011 event. While other
parts of Queensland were severely damaged, only three
houses sustained flood damage in Grantham in the 2013
flood compared with the 119 destroyed in 2011 event [30].
5.2. Legal
Ownership of the existing and new areas will be
exchanged between the project participants and the LVRC,
with detailed policy surrounding responsibilities defined
clearly in the Grantham Relocation Policy [25]. The LVRC
acquired all the necessary legal approvals from the QRA at
each step of the project. However, the project's legitimacy
in terms of existing land use planning procedures in
Queensland is open to criticism despite the approvals
provided by the QRA.
Despite differences in their approaches, land use plan-
ning and disaster management desire similar outcomes,
which are to ensure community safety and to maintain
residents’ quality of life [34]. There is no doubt in this case
that the land-swap is providing the best possible risk-
mitigation in terms of reducing exposure to future floods.
From the hazard-risk mitigation perspective, the safety of
residents must be prioritised. This notion complements
the idea of building sustainable settlements and living
T. Okada et al. / International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 8 (2014) 20–31 29environments, which is the stated aim of the Sustainable
Planning Act 2009 [48]. In addition, integrated strategies
of land use planning and hazard mitigation for sustainable
and resilient communities can reduce long-term costs,
developing hazard resistance and resilience [5]. Therefore,
a certain amount of flexibility is warranted so that funda-
mental societal priorities can be achieved with increased
timeliness. The conversion of the LVRC's urban footprint is
an example of such flexibility.
Critics might claim that the further development of
land blocks for new residents from outside the flood-
impacted areas goes beyond the flood recovery and miti-
gation aims of the scheme. However, the Queensland
Reconstruction Authority [42] approved the plan and the
associated demographic and economic changes should be
considered as valuable supporting factors for the recovery
process. The important point here is the definition of
LVRC's community recovery, which is the revitalisation of
the community as opposed to its restoration in a flood-
zone [28].
5.3. Economic
The market value of the new settled land is unknown.
However, since flooding negatively affects the value of
residential properties at least in the short term [56], it
may be assumed that these properties on the resettlement
site will attract higher prices than the original ones that
were flooded. The new site's market value may increase if
the project achieves the long-term success anticipated. The
exemption of some legal costs for resettlement will also
support project participants financially, e.g. exemption from
transfer duty. From a broader point of view, the Lockyer
Valley Economic Development Precinct is expected to
revitalise Grantham, providing opportunities for agricul-
tural businesses through better access to major transport
networks.
5.4. Social
Proximity to the existing township is an important
advantage of the resettlement project enabling the reset-
tlement area to maintain access to community networks
and social services such as schools and hospitals.
Moreover, community participation is a very important
factor in disaster recovery and community resettlement
[11]. To encourage this, the LVRC repeatedly held consulta-
tions/workshops with the flood-affected residents to under-
stand their needs and to ensure their participation in the
planning of the land-swap scheme [29]. Community parti-
cipation is considered to increase the capacity of the
community to recover and is often emphasised in disaster
practitioners’ reports [19] such as the International Red
Cross Code of Conduct for Disaster Relief (IFRC 1994 p.154 in
[22]) and the United Nations (Office of the UN Secretary-
General's Special Envoy for Tsunami Recovery 2006 p.154 In
[22]). Community participation is also essential to achieve
locally sustainable disaster management [33], and to enable
better integration of local knowledge with action and
concrete application of comprehensive goals [54]. Positive
media partnerships may have also strengthened theproject's progress. However, longer-term social impacts
may affect the community as the project advances.
The effects of resettlement should not be measured only at
the point of moving. It is anticipated that the transformation
of the communities in the LVRC area will continue. Short- and
long-term disaster recovery approaches should be distin-
guished from each other, while a socially comprehensive
and community-centred process is essential [16]. Following
up on the social impacts of disasters is important [55], because
their long-term impacts may be disproportionate within a
community and beyond [23]. In addition, anticipated out-
comes from the decisions made in the early stage of recovery
may not turn out as expected because of unknown factors.
Wisner et al. [54] suggest that recovery occurs when indivi-
duals have become more resilient to the next extreme event.
Therefore, the resettlement project must be considered as one
of a number of phases in the post-disaster recovery period.
The long-term effects of the disaster and the community
transformation need to be addressed as well. The relationship
between the community and development plan initiated by
the actions of the LVRC needs to be monitored over time. This
paper provides a detailed account of the background and
implementation of the scheme; the long-term effects and
experiences and attitudes of the community will be addressed
in ongoing research by the authors.
5.5. Psychological
Long-term psychological impacts of the project are
unknowable at this stage. Moreover, individual decision
making in terms of participation may have been affected
by psychological factors caused by the floods. Further
investigation is necessary, but addressing these lies
beyond the scope of the present study.
5.6. Cultural
The involvement of community members played an
important role in achieving a locally customised recovery
plan. Moreover, the Lockyer Valley Economic Development
Precinct plan focuses on re-development of the local-
representing agribusiness, which closely connects to the
local culture.
5.7. Environmental
The installation of infrastructure – sewerage, water
supply, roads, stormwater, earthworks – began on 7 June
2011, well before the residents moved in to the site in late
2011. The new sewerage system will be expanded into
other areas outside the new resettlement site in order to
allow for greater demands in the future. Building manage-
ment will rely on individual residents.
5.8. Political-administrative
The rapid progress of the land-swap project was driven
by the LVRC but supported by the community and other
groups including the QRA. As mentioned earlier, the LVRC
eventually acquired $18 million from the federal and state
Governments. However, political disagreement between
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generated initial difficulties for the recovery process.
The LVRC initiated the project as the state government
was not supportive. However, not all local governments
would be in a position financially to enact such a project.
The initial disagreement meant that a large amount of
extra work was required for the LVRC to achieve the inter-
governmental support. This should have been avoided in
the emergency situation, although the state government's
real intent of the opposition is unknown. The early phases
of disaster recovery require organisational and operational
improvisation, agility and adaptability as well as discipline
[15]. Discussion on various phases of disaster and asso-
ciated governmental interactions are critical to achieve
better performance in emergency management [53].
Governments should utilise the post-disaster situation
for future risk reduction opportunities [5].
5.9. Territorial
The land-swap scheme is implemented within the
LVRC area. Therefore, no territorial conflict between local
governments is anticipated. While the resettlement pro-
ject rapidly provided a safer environment for the flood
-impacted residents from an emergency management
perspective, it might be considered questionable by some
in being inconsistent with the existing planning scheme.
6. Conclusion
The issues and challenges of the 2011 Lockyer Valley
flash flooding have been reviewed and discussed in this
paper, focusing on community resettlement. Torrential
rainfall on the saturated steep land configuration caused
violent flash flooding and the lack of warning exacerbated
the outcome. Despite the level of damage, the LVRC
committed to work on the Grantham land-swap project
in an innovative manner with a community-led focus.
Despite initial hesitation, the state and federal govern-
ments eventually supported the scheme.
In terms of the stages developed by Oliver-Smith [32]
and Scudder [46] in relation to compulsory resettlement,
the LVRC's process is moving quickly from stage 1 to 3,
although the participation of the LVRC's land-swap is
totally voluntary. The findings from the analysis of the
land-swap project show positive achievements in most
aspects proposed for a successful resettlement [11] despite
its rapid advancement.
The series of speedy actions was largely driven by the
LVRC's commitment and initiative supported by the com-
munity members and other groups. The LVRC responded
to an emergency situation, despite the political resistance
and bureaucratic turmoil, in order to reduce future flood
risks, focusing on generating motivation for sustainable
development in the community. The high level of partici-
pation in the land-swap project also demonstrates that the
project has been widely accepted by the flood-impacted
residents.
However, some dimensions such as economic, social,
psychological, cultural and environmental factors that are
outside the scope of this research warrant furtherinvestigation. In addition, this paper is limited to the local
governmental perspective. Therefore, further research
from other perspectives including the residents also must
be undertaken to better understand the multifaceted
nature of disaster recovery, including, but not limited to,
the financial viability of the project in relation to the
affordability of resettlement, the use of the $35,000
government grant and contributions (or lack thereof) from
flood insurance.
In the LVRC's case, the set of area-specific factors of a
relatively small population, immediate availability of the
land for resettlement adjacent to the existing township
and sufficient reserve in the LVRC significantly facilitated
the early-stage success of the resettlement. However, the
flexibility demonstrated by the LVRC including the early
community consultations and political strategies should be
learnt as a potential solution to achieve fundamental goals,
in this case reducing flood risk. Without this approach, the
resettlement might not have been realised despite the
presence of the unique factors listed above.
More widely, a continuing focus and further investiga-
tion is needed into how natural hazard risks can best be
mitigated during the recovery process. This necessitates a
serious review of existing land use planning systems and
active discussion and collaboration between a wide range
of groups including communities, policy makers, practi-
tioners and academics.Acknowledgements
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